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Abstract
We study the eﬀects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the
wage of other workers within the same firm. We assume a competitive labor market
with unobservable eﬀort, where firms condition wages on output as incentive for ef-
fort. If workers who care about status are also more productive, such status concerns
generate an equilibrium with heterogenous firms where workers who care and work-
ers who do not care about status work together. Such firms provide workers who
care about status with stronger incentives to exert eﬀort, compared with workers
who do not care. In addition, there will be homogenous firms who employ work-
ers of the same type. The main result is that status concerns increase within firm
wage diﬀerences and over all wage inequality. The diﬀerence from previous studies
(e.g., Frank 1984a, 1984b) is that eﬀort is elastically supplied and staus concerns
increase ouput. The positive correlation between status concerns and productivity
is derived as part of the equilibrium, because workers who care about status signal
their stronger motivation through investment in schooling.
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”For my part, I had rather be the first man among these fellows than the second man
in Rome.” Julius Caesar, according to Plutarch, ”.. in his journey, as he was crossing
the Alps, and passing by a small village of the barbarians with but few inhabitants, and
those wretchedly poor..”
”Rabbi Masya ben (son of) Charash said, be first to greet every person, and be a tail
to the lions rather than head of the foxes.” Mishna, Pirkei Avot.
1 Introduction
The typical justifications for team work is that workers complement each other in pro-
duction. This type of interdependence influences the organization of workers and teams
and consequently the market equilibrium. In this paper we consider another type of in-
terdependence which arises from social interactions in the work place. Economists have
long recognized that workers may care not only about their own wage but also about
their relative standing in the distribution of wages. Such concerns arise from several, po-
tentially conflicting, considerations such as fairness and the desire to attain or maintain
social status.1 Following Frank (1985), we wish to investigate the implications of the de-
mand for local status, where workers prefer to work in firms in which they obtain a higher
wage than their co-workers.2 The novel feature of our approach is that we recognize that
the demand for local status creates an incentive to exert eﬀort, which aﬀects the wage
schedules oﬀered by firms and generates internal wage diﬀerences.3 The purpose of the
paper is to study the impact of local status concerns, in a competitive market, on the
structure of firms, the monetary incentives that they oﬀer and the implications for output
and wages.
Local status has the special feature that one person’s gain is another one’s loss. There-
1The relationship between wage inequality, fairness and morale is discussed by Hicks (1963), Reder
(1957), and Lazear (1989), among others. The relationship between wages and status has been discussed
by Smith (1776), Frank (1985), and Fershtman and Weiss (1993), among others.
2Zizo and Oswald (1999) bring experimental evidence showing two third of the subjects were willing
to sacrifice their own income, in order to reduce the income of other participants in the experinent.
3Auriol and Renault (1999) also analyze the impact of status concerns on incentives in a principal
agent model. They allow firms to provide, at no cost, status symbols that are independent of wages, and
show that higher levels of eﬀort can be elicited.
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fore, one would expect firms to hire workers with similar productivity, or, if workers diﬀer
in productivity, induce them to narrow their performance diﬀerences, so as to reduce wage
inequality within firms. However, status concerns can also be a strong motivating factor.
A worker who cares about status will exert eﬀort in an attempt to outdo his colleagues.
By mixing workers with diﬀerent productivity, it is possible to elicit more team eﬀort, if
the more productive workers care more about status. Therefore, it is possible that status
concerns will lead to the emergence of mixed firms, with stronger monetary incentives to
the workers who care more about status. Thus, in general, status concerns can decrease
or increase inequality in performance and rewards.
To study the impact of status concerns, we use a standard principal agent framework
in which firms consist of two workers and a principal. The workers’ eﬀort is unobserved
and wages are paid based on their output, which is a noisy measure of their eﬀort. The
outputs of the two workers depend on their own productivity and eﬀort and are, in
this respect, independent. However, each worker’s utility may depend on the wage of the
other workers employed by the firm.4 Workers may diﬀer in their productivity and in their
attitude towards status. The model incorporates the restrictions implied by competitive
equilibrium in that workers are free to move across firms and there is a free entry of firms.
Equilibrium in such a model is an organization of work (allocation of workers among
firms), an incentive structure for each firm such that workers cannot benefit from moving
between firms, and finally no firm (or a potential entrant) may improve its profits by
changing the mix of its workers or the incentive scheme that it provides.
Initially, we assume risk neutrality and that workers who care about status are the
more productive. In line with Frank, we find that in equilibrium, firms then will consist
of a mix of status minded workers and workers that do not care about status. Intuitively,
such heterogenous firms can create a status surplus compared to homogenous firms. To
motivate a positive correlation between productivity and status concerns, we then consider
the endogenous determination of workers’ productivity through investment in schooling.
4The assumption of independence in production allows us to focus on the interactions that results
from preferences. In this respect, our approach is similar to Lazear (1989) and Kandel and Lazear (1992)
and Rotemberg (1994) that allow the utility of each worker to depend on the eﬀort of other workers.
There is a large literature on matching based on productive interactions. The papers by Landers et al.,
1996, and Li and Rosen, 1998, have some features that are similar to our model.
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We show that separating equilibria exist in which workers who care about status invest in
schooling, while those who do not care about status refrain from such investment. This
allows firms to sort workers with diﬀerent preferences for status. We thus incorporate an
important and often mentioned role of schools, which is to identify the individuals who
are highly motivated.
Frank showed that when labor is supplied inelastically, status concerns reduce the wage
diﬀerences within firms and increase overall wage equality. It remains true in both models
that status concerns imply wage compression, whereby the status minded workers receive
lower wages lower their expected output. However, in our model, the induced changes
in the eﬀort and output of the two agents are suﬃciently large to support an increase in
internal wage diﬀerences, so that status concerns increase the overall inequality in wages.
The introduction of risk aversion sharpens some of the results and yields some new
ones. In particular, firms provide stronger incentives for eﬀort to status minded workers
than for workers that do not care about status, and the wage diﬀerences within firms
become more pronounced under risk aversion. The reason is quite simple. Conditioned on
eﬀort, wages are random, and workers that care about wage diﬀerences bear an additional
risk, and hence will require additional compensation. We also show that, by conditioning
the wage positively on the co-workers’ output, firms provide insurance against the added
risk generated by other workers. This result is in contrast to comparative payments
based on a positive correlation in the random shocks, where wages depend negatively on
the output of co-workers, because co-workers having a high output indicates that luck
(rather than eﬀort) was detrimental to output (see Prendergast, 1999, and Gibbons and
Waldman, 1999).
An important conclusion of this paper is that status concerns can aﬀect education,
wages and output, both at the firm level and in the economy at large. In this respect,
our model establishes a link between cultural aspects of a society and its economic perfor-
mance. However, diﬀerent societies may diﬀer in culture, implying a diﬀerent distribution
of preferences or diﬀerent status concerns. In an extension, we discuss several alterna-
tive types of status concerns. First, we examine the impact of global status concerns,
where workers care about the average wage in society, in addition to the wages of their
co-workers. We show that, in contrast to local status concerns that weaken wage incen-
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tives, global status concerns sharpen these incentives. The reason is that firms internalize
only the within firm interactions in eﬀort. Second, we consider the case in which workers
observe the eﬀort of their co-workers. Assuming that high relative wage have less influ-
ence on status if it is associated with more eﬀort, and that socially minded workers may
feel more inclined to exert eﬀort if other workers do, we show that such preferences may
change the equilibrium organization of work and that a homogenous firms structure can
emerge.
2 The model
Consider an economy with a large number of workers and firms. Firms oﬀer workers a
wage contract. Workers choose in which firm to work depending on the contracts they are
oﬀered and the characteristics of the firms. There is a free mobility of workers between
firms and no entry or exit costs for firms. The output of a worker, yi, depends only
on his own attributes and actions. We let yi = tiei + εi; where ei denotes his eﬀort,
ti his productivity and εi is an iid random shock, normally distributed with E(εi) = 0
and E(ε2i ) = σ
2. We assume that firms have a capacity constraint and employ only two
workers. Each firm’s output is the sum of the output of the two workers.
Let wi be agent i’s realized wage and v(ei) = 12e
2
i be the cost of his eﬀort. We assume
that workers care not only about the their own wage, but also about the diﬀerence in
wage from the other workers in the firm, which is a measure of their local status. Letting
wj be the wage of another worker who is employed by the same firm as worker i. The
utility function is assumed to be of the form
ui = f(wi + δiβ(wi − wj)− 1
2
e2i ), (1)
where β represents the relative importance of local status compared with own consump-
tion, and δi, δi ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or not individual i cares about status. Initially,
we assume risk neutrality, so that f (.) is linear. Risk aversion, where f (.) is concave, will
be discussed in a separate section.
We assume that the output of each agent is observable and can be contracted upon. We
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restrict ourselves to contracts in which wages are linear in output. Under risk neutrality,
it is suﬃcient to condition the wage of each worker on his own wage to achieve the first
best levels of eﬀort. We thus set
wi = si + aiyi, i = 1, 2. (2)
where si is the salary and ai is the ’piece rate’. Later, when we shall discuss risk aversion,
we will consider a more general contract space in which wages depend on the output
of both workers. Given the contract, workers choose eﬀort to maximize their expected
utility, yielding
ei = aiti(1 + δiβ), i = 1, 2. (3)
The implied expected profits made by the firm are,
E(π) = t1e1(1− a1) + e2t2(1− a2)− s1 − s2. (4)
Given the characteristics of the workers that join the firm (ti, δi), the risk neutral firm
chooses the wage parameters (si, ai); i = 1, 2, so that expected profits are maximized and
each worker obtains at least his reservation utility ri. Given our assumption of competitive
markets with no entry and exit costs, all firms make zero profits in equilibrium, regardless
of the type of agents they employ. The workers’ reservation values, ri are endogenously
determined and depend on the contracts oﬀered by other firms. We must therefore solve
for an equilibrium that specifies contracts in all firms, using the condition that agents
cannot benefit by switching employers.
In most of our analysis, we shall assume that there are only two types of workers:
Workers of type 1 who care about their local status, i.e., δ = 1, with productivity t1,
and workers of type 2 who do not care about status, i.e., δ = 0, with productivity t2. We
denote the proportions in the population of type 1 and type 2 agents by ξ and (1 − ξ),
respectively, where 0 < ξ < 1. Initially, we assume that firms can observe the type of
their employees. Later, we shall discuss signaling of preferences for status, δi, through
investments in schooling.
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3 The determination of eﬀort
Consider the maximization problem of a firm employing two workers, say 1 and 2. The
associated Lagrangian is
L = E(π) + λ1[E(u1)− r1] + λ2[E(u2)− r2]. (5)
For any choice of the incentive parameters (a1, a2) the maximization with respect to
(s1, s2) yields
λi =
1 + 2δjβ
1 + δ1β + δ2β
, i, j = 1, 2. (6)
The weight given to each agent is a constant that depends on the preferences of the two
workers, (β, δ1,δ2) but not on their productiveness, (t1, t2). It follows that the firm would
choose the incentive parameters (a1, a2) so as to maximize
W = t1e1 + e2t2 − λ1v(e1)− λ2v(e2), (7)
and the induced eﬀort levels must satisfy
ei =
ti
λi
, i = 1, 2. (8)
Because of the interdependence in preferences, firms with a diﬀerent mix of workers will
provide diﬀerent incentives to their workers. At equilibrium, some firms will employ agents
of identical preferences (i.e., homogenous firms) while other firms may employ agents of
diﬀerent types (i.e., heterogenous firms). The first question that we will consider is the
possibility of coexistence of homogenous and heterogenous firms in the market. Such
coexistence may give rise to wage dispersion which is not based on ex-ante heterogeneity
in preferences or productivity. That is, workers of the same type get diﬀerent wage simply
because they work at diﬀerent types of firms and are therefore provided with a diﬀerent
compensation scheme.
Given our transferable utility setup, we can determine the incentive structure provided
for each type of workers and the consequent eﬀort level before considering the full market
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equilibrium, because these are independent of the reservation utility levels.
Homogenous firms
Consider, first, a firm that hires two workers, say 1 and 2, with the same preferences,
but with possibly diﬀerent productivities.
Proposition 1 The eﬀort levels in homogenous firms are independent of whether workers
care about (local) status and are given by e∗1 = t1 and e
∗
2 = t2.
Proof. In a firm that employ two identical workers, equation (7) implies that each
worker receives a weight of unity, that is, λ1 = λ2 = 1. Thus, using equation (8), we
obtain that the induced levels of eﬀort are ei = ti, i = 1, 2.
The independence of eﬀort from the status parameter, β, follows from the fact that
local status concerns are purely relative and wash out when the firm hires workers with
identical preferences.
To implement this first best outcome, the firm oﬀers a contract that gives the incentive
ai = 1, if the two agents do not care about status (δ1 = δ2 = 0) and ai = 11+β , i = 1, 2, if
the two workers care about status (δ1 = δ2 = 1).
When both workers care about status, incentives are slackened (i.e., ai < 1). Intu-
itively, agents in such a case are eager to invest more eﬀort as both wish to obtain higher
status. If the same incentives were given as to workers who do not care about status, i.e.,
ai = 1, status minded workers would work too hard, to the point where their marginal
product exceed their marginal cost of eﬀort, trying to gain status. The outcome of such a
”rat-race” would be that no one gains status. The firm act as a coordinator and mitigates
the wasteful competition by reducing the monetary incentive for eﬀort, compensating the
workers with a fixed payment.
Heterogenous firms
Consider now a firm that hires two agents, one that cares about status (worker 1),
while the other (worker 2) does not. The two workers will be induced to provide eﬀort
levels that depend on their preferences, as well as on their productivity. Using (6) and
(8), the first best eﬀort for the two types of workers are
e1 = (1 + β)t1, e2 =
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
. (9)
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The firm can achieve the first best by setting
a1 = 1; a2 =
(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)
. (10)
Proposition 2 A firm employing two workers with diﬀerent preferences for status gives
the status oriented agent a stronger incentive to exert eﬀort. The worker who cares about
status exerts more eﬀort than he would in a firm with identical workers, while the worker
who does not care about status will exert less eﬀort than he would in a firm with identical
workers.
Again, the firm acts as a coordinator. Imagine that each worker in an heterogenous
firm would choose his own eﬀort and obtain all the resulting income. Then the worker
who cares about status will choose an eﬀort level e1 = (1 + β)t1 and the one who does
not care about status would choose e2 = t2. This is not an eﬃcient outcome, as agent 2
in such a case does not internalize the negative eﬀect of his eﬀort and wage on the status
and utility of agent 1. A firm can, with appropriate side payments, increase the utility of
both workers by reducing the eﬀort of the worker who does not care about status. The
firm has an interest in doing so, because it can then attract workers at lower wages.
Given that heterogenous firms induce the status minded workers to exert more eﬀort,
while inducing the workers who do not care about status to reduce their eﬀort, one worker
raises his output while the other reduces it. It is natural to ask, therefore, what happens
to the total expected output of the firm. We find
Proposition 3 An increase in the preference for status, β, raises the total expected output
of an heterogenous firm if the workers who care about status are more productive, or if β
is suﬃciently large.
Proof. The total expected output of an heterogenous firm, yhet, is given by
yhet = t21(1 + β) +
t22(1 + β)
1 + 2β
(11)
The derivative with respect to β is t21 − t
2
2
(1+2β)2
, which is positive if t1 > t2 or if β is
suﬃciently large.
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The main reason for the increase in output is that heterogenous firms shift eﬀort
from the low productivity worker who does not care about status, to the high productive
workers who cares about status. However, under our assumptions, Proposition 3 holds
even if workers who care about status are less productive, because the increase in eﬀort
by the status minded worker more then oﬀsets the reduction in eﬀort by his co-worker
who does not care about status.5
Corollary 1 A rearrangement in the organization of work, whereby two homogenous
firms, one employing two workers who care about status and the other employing two
workers who do not care about status exchange one worker, creating two new heteroge-
nous firms, increases total expected output (because under the conditions of Proposition
3, yhet > t21 + t
2
2).
4 Market equilibrium
We have seen that the type of workers who join the firm can influence the firm’s out-
put and the workers’ welfare. We now examine the matching pattern that emerges in a
market equilibrium. In particular, we wish to provide conditions on (t1, t2, β) for het-
erogenous firms to be formed and to characterize the wage and employment structure in
such equilibria. For this purpose, we make two simplifying assumptions.
Assumption 1: There is a perfect positive correlation between productivity and
preferences for status. In particular, all workers with δ = 1 have productivity t1 and all
workers with δ = 0 have productivity t2, where t1 > t2.
This assumption will be justified later as a consequence of equilibrium behavior. Per-
fect correlation allows us to define unambiguously two types of workers.
Assumption 2: One of the types is in strict majority. That is, either ξ > .5 or ξ < .5.
We consider the following market game. There is a fixed number of agents. Agents may
be either of type 1 or type 2 as specified above. The distribution of types is exogenously
given and the agents’ type is observable. There is a large number of firms with free
5This feature relies on the assumed linearity of the marginal disutility from eﬀort, and need not hold
if this function is convex.
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entry and exit. Firms oﬀer employment contracts that may depend on the agents’ type.
Workers choose the firm they work for and there is a free mobility of workers among firms.
Since each firm employs exactly two workers, there must be some firms that employ two
workers of the majority type.6 That is, at equilibrium, there are always homogenous firms
that employ two workers of the majority type. Since we assume free mobility, workers of
the majority type must have the same utility in homogenous and heterogenous firms. If
two workers of type j work in the same firm, their expected joint output is 2t2j . Because
the two workers have identical preferences and productivity, the wage for each of them
equal t2j and they will have the same disutility from work,
1
2
t2j . The equality of wages
implies that no local status is provided in homogenous firms, and the workers expected
utility is, therefore, 1
2
t2j . Thus, if j is the majority type, his reservation utility is
rj =
1
2
t2j , j = 1, 2. (12)
We can now calculate the utility of the minority type worker in a heterogenous firms and
compare it to what he might get in a homogenous firm consisting of two minority workers.
If we can show that the minority workers get a higher utility working with heterogenous
firm then, at equilibrium, all workers of the minority type will work in heterogenous firms.
If the minority workers get higher utility working with homogenous type firms then, then
there are no heterogeneous firms in equilibrium, implying that some firms will hire only
type 1 workers and some firms will hire only type 2 workers.
Proposition 4 (Industry Structure) Heterogenous firms are always formed in equilib-
rium, if status minded workers are at least as productive as those who do not care about
status, i.e., t1 ≥ t2. When a type j is the minority, all workers of this type will be employes
in heterogenous firms. When a type j is the majority type, then there are some homoge-
nous firms employing two workers of type j and some heterogenous firms employing the
two diﬀerent types of workers.
Proof. Case 1: Workers who care about status are the minority in the population
6If there is an uneven number of workers, one majority worker will be self employed. Because we
assume no interaction in production, this worker will have the same utility and wages as the majority
workers in homogenous firms. Thus, with no loss of generality, we may assume an even number of workers.
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(ξ < 1
2
). Since there are more workers of type 2 we know that at equilibrium there must
be firms that employ two workers of type 2. If an heterogenous firm is formed, employing
a type 1 worker together with type 2 worker, then, by (6) and (8), it induces the eﬀort
levels:
e1 = (1 + β)t1; e2 =
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
.
By the zero profits condition, the expected wage bill of this heterogenous firm must equal
the expected output. Using the above eﬀort levels to calculate the expected output yields
that
E(w1) + E(w2) = t1e1 + t2e2 = (1 + β)t
2
1 +
(1 + β)t22
(1 + 2β)
. (13)
Since ξ < .5, a type 2 worker, who is the majority type, must get his reservation utility.
Letting E(w2) be the expected wage of type 2 worker in heterogenous firm, then E(w2)
consists of two terms: the reservation utility t
2
2
2
and a compensation for the eﬀort this
worker exerts. Thus, at equilibrium, E(w2) is given by
E(w2) =
1
2
[
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
]2 +
1
2
t22. (14)
We can now subtract from the total wage bill for the two workers, the expected wage of
worker type 2, given by to obtain the expected wage of type 1 worker in heterogenous
firms.
E(w1) = (1 + β)t
2
1 +
(1 + β)t22
(1 + 2β)
− 1
2
[
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
]2 − 1
2
t22 (15)
= (1 + β)t21 −
β2t22
2(1 + 2β)2
.
The expected utility of a type 1 worker who is employed by a heterogenous firm depends
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on his expected wage, his expected local status and the cost of eﬀort he exerts:
E(u1) = E(w1) + βE(w1 − w2) − 1
2
[(1 + β)t1]
2 (16)
=
1
2
(1 + β)2t21 −
β(2 + 3β)t22
2(1 + 2β)
.
We are now able to determine which type of firms will be formed in equilibrium. Recall
that if two type 1 workers would work in an homogenous firm each would receive an
expected utility 1
2
t21. Thus, heterogenous firms will form at equilibrium only if the expected
utility of type 1 workers who work in such a firms is greater than their expected utility
when they work for an homogenous firm. Therefore, it remains to compare these two
expressions and to check under what condition type 1 workers would prefer to work for
an heterogenous firm.
∆E(u1) = E(u1)− 1
2
t21 (17)
=
1
2
(2β + β2)t21 −
β(2 + 3β)t22
2(1 + 2β)
.
Heterogenous firms will be formed when ∆E(u1) > 0. In such a situation, if there are
only homogenous firms in the market, then a new firm may enter and gain positive profits
by providing the above incentives. Workers of both types will be wiling to join such a firm
rather than staying in their previous homogenous type firm.7 Using (17), the condition
that guarantees the formation of heterogenous firms is:
t21
t22
>
(2 + 3β)
(2 + β)(1 + 2β)
. (18)
It is easy to verify that condition (18) is satisfied whenever t1 ≥ t2.
Case 2: Workers who care about status are the majority in the population (ξ > 1
2
).
We follow the same procedure as in the previous case. Because type 1 workers are the
majority, there must be some homogenous firms that employ only type 1 workers. Thus,
if there are heterogenous firms in equilibrium, the type 1 workers in those firms obtain
7Although a type 2 worker will be indiﬀerent between moving and staying, the continuity of the payoﬀ
functions imply that it is possible to slightly improve his wage yet retaining the ∆E(u1) > 0 condition.
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their reservation utility, which is their expected utility in an homogenous firm. Therefore,
E(w1)(1 + β)− βE(w2)− 1
2
[(1 + β)t1]
2 =
1
2
t21. (19)
Using this indiﬀerence condition and the zero profits condition (13) we obtain
E(w1) = t
2
1
1 + 2β + 3
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+ t22
β(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)2
, (20)
E(w2) = t
2
1
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+ t22
(1 + β)2
(1 + 2β)2
. (21)
The expected utility of a type 2 worker who is employed by an heterogenous firm is his
expected wage minus his cost of eﬀort. Thus,
E(u2) = E(w2)− 1
2
[
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
]2 (22)
= t21
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+
t22
2
(1 + β)2
(1 + 2β)2
.
Recall that if two type 2 workers would work in an homogenous firm, each would receive
an expected utility 1
2
t22. Thus, the utility gain for the type 2 worker from working in an
heterogenous firm rather than in an homogenous firm is
∆E(u2) = t
2
1
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+
t22
2
(1 + β)2
(1 + 2β)2
− 1
2
t22 (23)
= t21
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
− 1
2
t22
2β + 3β2
(1 + 2β)2
.
Heterogenous firms will be formed only if ∆E(u2) > 0. Rearranging the above condition
yields the same condition as in the previous section in which type 2 workers were the
majority type.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is clear. If the two types mix, and both types exert the
same eﬀort as in homogenous firms, the expected utility of type 1 worker rises while the
expected utility of type 2 and expected profits remain the same. By coordinating eﬀorts
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levels, raising the eﬀort of type 1 worker and reducing the eﬀort of the type 2 worker, the
firm can further increase the expected utility of the minority type, keeping the expected
utility of the majority type fixed at its reservation value, while holding expected profits
constant. Thus, the basic reason for mixing diﬀerent types is the local status that is
generated as a by product if the workers care about status are more productive, or if
modifications in eﬀort can support wage diﬀerence.
Remark 1 Mixing occurs even if the workers who care about status are less productive,
provided that the modified behavior through changes in eﬀort is strong enough to overcome
the negative impact of productivity on local status. The necessary and suﬃcient condition
for mixing is t
2
1
t22
> (2+3β)
(2+β)(1+2β)
Remark 2 Because status concerns are local and fully internalized by the firms, the com-
petitive allocation of workers to firms is Pareto eﬃcient.
The equilibrium wages of each type depend on their relative supply and the organiza-
tion of work in the following manner.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium:
i) Wage compression. Workers in homogenous firms receive expected wages that
equal their expected output. Type 1 (type 2) workers in heterogenous firms receive expected
wages that exceed (fall short of) their expected output.
ii)Within firm wage diﬀerences: Type 1 workers earn a higher expected wage than
type 2 workers in heterogenous firms.
(iii) Firm eﬀect on the majority type: (a)If type 1 workers are in the majority,
then type 1 workers who are employed in heterogenous firms are paid a higher expected
wage than those in homogenous firms. (b)If type 2 workers are the majority, ξ < .5, their
expected wage in heterogenous firms are lower than in homogenous firms.
(iv) Firm eﬀect on the minority type: (a)If type 1 workers are in minority, their
expected wage exceeds the expected wage of the type 2 workers in homogenous firms. (b)If
type 2 workers are in minority, they earn less (more) than type 1 workers in homogenous
firms, if the preference for status, β, of the type 1 workers is small (large) enough.
(v) Across firms wage diﬀerences: The mean expected wage in heterogenous firms
exceed the mean wage in homogenous firms, if ξ < .5 or if ξ > .5 and β is large enough.
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Proof. From our previous analysis, we know that ej = tj, j = 1, 2 in homogenous
firms and e1 = (1 + β)t1; e2 =
(1+β)t2
(1+2β)
in heterogenous firms. Thus, the expected outputs
are t2j , j = 1, 2 in homogenous firms and (1+β)t
2
1,
(1+β)t22
(1+2β)
in heterogenous firms. The zero
profit condition implies that the expected wage bill equals the expected output. Thus,
workers of type j receive E(wj) = t2j homogenous firms. Wages in heterogenous firms
depend on the distribution of types in the population as follows.
Case 1 (ξ < .5): When type 1 workers are the minority then, by (13) and (14), the
expected wages for the two types in heterogenous firms satisfy
(1 + β)t21 > E(w1) = (1 + β)t
2
1 − t22
β2
2(1 + 2β)2
> t21,
(1 + β)t22
(1 + 2β)
< E(w2) =
1
2
[
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
]2 +
1
2
t22 < t
2
2.
Thus, heterogenous firms are characterized by wage compression, that is, type 1 workers
earn less than their expected output and type 2 workers earn more than their expected
output. Also, type 1 workers earn more than type 2 workers, in homogenous or heteroge-
nous firms, because E(w1) > t21 > t
2
2 > E(w2). Finally, by (13), the sum of wages in
heterogenous firms (1 + β)t21 +
(1+β)t22
(1+2β)
exceed the sum of wages in homogenous firms, 2t22.
Case 2 (ξ > .5.): When type 2 workers are the minority then, by (19) and (20), the
expected wages for the two types in heterogenous firms satisfy
(1 + β)t21 > E(w1) = t
2
1
1 + 2β + 3
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+ t22
β(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)2
> t21,
and
E(w1) > E(w2) = t
2
1
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+ t22
(1 + β)2
(1 + 2β)2
>
(1 + β)t22
(1 + 2β)
.
Thus, type 2 workers in homogenous firms earn more than their expected output. Also,
their wages fall short of the wages of the type 1 co-workers in heterogenous firms, E(w2) <
E(w1). The wages of type 2 workers exceed the wages of type 1 workers in homogenous
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firms, t21, if and only if
t21
t22
< (1+β)
2
(1+2β)(1+β−.5β2) . Finally, by (13), the sum of wages in het-
erogenous firms (1 + β)t21 +
(1+β)t22
(1+2β)
exceeds the sum of wages in homogenous firms, 2t21 if
t22
t21
> 1+2β
1+β
(1− β).
Usually, one would expect the more productive type 1 workers to earn higher wages.
With status concerns, however, this may not hold because the more productive workers
care about status and are willing to pay for it. The presence of such payment is indicated
by the wage compression that occurs in heterogenous firms, whereby the status minded
worker transfers part of his output to the worker who does not care about status, as
a payment for the association and for the willingness to reduce eﬀort. The size of this
payment depends on the relative supply of the two types and the incentives to exert eﬀort
provided to the two types of workers. Our results show that, in heterogenous firms, type 1
workers always receive a higher (expected) wage than type 2 workers. The basic reason for
this result is the stronger incentive to exert eﬀort provided to the status minded workers
and the weaker incentive to exert eﬀort provided to the workers who do not care about
status. Thus, if type 2 workers are the majority then they are kept at their reservation
utility, and their reduced eﬀort must also imply a lower expected wage. On the other
hand, the type 1 workers, who exert more eﬀort, are compensated partially by increased
status and partially by increased wages. If type 2 workers are in the minority, this eﬀect
is mitigated because such workers will be compensated in part for the association with
type 1 workers. For suﬃciently strong preference for status, the type 2 workers earn more
than type 1 workers in homogenous firms.
An important implication of Proposition 5, is that status concerns can cause a positive
correlation between the mean wage and internal wage variability across firms:
Corollary 2 If ξ < .5 or ξ > .5 and the preference for status, β, is large enough, then
firms that pay higher average wages also have higher internal wage diﬀerences.
The surprising aspect of this result is that it can hold even when type 1 workers are
in the majority, so that mean productivity in heterogenous firms, t1+t2
2
is lower than in
homogenous firms, t1. This occurs when the incentive eﬀects of mixing can be strong
enough, to induce type 1 workers in heterogenous firms to the extent that total output
and wages are higher than in homogenous firms.
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So far, we have only discussed the total expected wage payment. We will now examine
the specific compensation schedules provided by each type of firm. We can find the
equilibrium compensation schedule of type 1 workers employed by an homogenous firm
by setting the incentives so as to obtain the first best level of eﬀort and setting the fixed
payment to satisfy the zero profits constraint. That is,
whom1 = s
hom
1 + y/(1 + β) (24)
where shom1 =
β
(1+β)
t21. Note that this compensation schedule is independent of the distri-
bution of types in the population.
From our previous analysis, we know that heterogenous firms provide the incentives
ai = 1 for type 1 workers. In such a case, the choice of eﬀort will be e1 = (1 + β)t1 and
the resulting output is y = (1 + β)t21. The overall expected wage of type 1 worker at
heterogenous firms is given by (15) or (20). The implied compensation schedule is
whet1 = s
het
1 + y, (25)
where
shet1 =

−t22
β2
2(1 + 2β)2
< 0 if ξ < .5
−t21
2β + β2
2(1 + 2β)
+ t22
β(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)2
< 0 if ξ > .5
(26)
Type 2 workers who are employed by homogenous firms face the payment schedule whom2 =
y, but working for an heterogenous firm, their payment schedule is
whet2 = s
het
2 +
1 + β
1 + 2β
y, (27)
where
shet2 =

−1
2
[
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
]2 + 1
2
t22 > 0 if ξ < .5
t21
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
> 0 if ξ > .5
(28)
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The negative fixed payment to the status minded workers and the positive fixed payment
to the workers who do not care about status reflects the transfers between the two types
of workers. One would expect a transfer to type 2 workers when they are in a minority,
ξ > .5. When these workers are in the majority, ξ < .5, they still receive a positive,
smaller, transfer. This holds because the status minded workers ”pay” not only for the
association with less productive workers, but also for their willingness to reduce eﬀort, so
as to generate higher local status within heterogenous firms.
5 Eﬀects of status concerns
Having characterized the economy with status concerns, we are now ready to compare
the equilibria that arise with and without status concerns.
In the absence of any status concerns, where β = 0, eﬀort of worker i will be set to
equate his marginal cost of eﬀort to his productivity, so that ei = ti, implying output
and wages of t2i . Because we assume no interactions in production, aggregate output and
the distribution of wages are independent of the organization of work. In contrast, if
workers care about status, the eﬀort and output of each worker depend on the type of his
co-workers and the matching pattern that emerges in equilibrium influences output and
wages.
5.1 Aggregate output
Let there be n firms and 2n workers then aggregate output, Y , is
Y =
 2n
³
ξ[t21(1 + β) + t
2
2
(1+β)
(1+2β)
] + (1− 2ξ)t22,
´
if ξ < .5,
2n
³
(1− ξ)[t21(1 + β) + t22 (1+β)(1+2β) ] + [1− 2(1− ξ)]t21
´
if ξ > .5.
(29)
As we have shown in Proposition 3, an increase in β raises the output of heterogenous
firms if type 1 workers are more productive than type 2 workers. Under this condition, an
increase in β must also raise aggregate output, because, given ξ, the number of heteroge-
nous firms is fixed. An increase in ξ has a more complex eﬀect. If ξ < .5 then, because
the low productivity, type 2, workers are replaced by high productivity, type 1 workers,
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who also exert more eﬀort when placed in heterogenous firms. However, if ξ > .5 then
the new type 1 workers are placed in homogenous firms where they exert less eﬀort, so
that aggregate output will decline if β is suﬃciently high. Specifically, aggregate output
will decline if yhet > t21 (i.e.,if t
2
2
(1+β)
(1+2β)
> t21(1− β)) and rise otherwise. We conclude that:
Proposition 6 (a) An increase in status concerns β raises aggregate output.
(b) For a small β, an increase in the proportion of agents who care about status, ξ,
raises aggregate output.
(c) For β suﬃciently large, aggregate output rises if ξ < .5 and declines if ξ > .5 so
that aggregate output is maximized when the population is (almost) evenly divided between
the two types of agents.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 6 and describes the output per worker for t1 = 1.5,
t2 = 1, and β = 0, 0.5, 1.
5.2 Inequality
In the absence of status concerns, there are only two levels of (expected) wages, corre-
sponding to the two productivity groups. With status concerns, the expected wage of
each worker depend on the characteristics of co-workers and the equilibrium matching.
Consequently, in equilibrium, there are three levels of expected wages. If ξ < .5, and type
2 workers are in the majority, then the (expected) wage distribution is
E(whet2 ) =
1
2
[
(1 + β)t2
(1 + 2β)
]2 +
1
2
t22, with a weight of ξ, (30)
E(whom2 ) = t
2
2, with a weight of 1− 2ξ,
E(whet1 ) = (1 + β)t
2
1 −
β2t22
2(1 + 2β)2
, with a weight of ξ.
Because E(whet2 ) < t
2
2 < t
2
1 < E(w
het
1 ), it is clear that, for any β, the inequality with
status concerns is higher. Moreover, because the diﬀerence, E(whet1 )− E(whet2 ) increases
in β, wage inequality rises monotonically with status concerns.
If ξ > .5, then type 2 workers, who are in the minority, receive a payment for the
association. In this case, the results depend on the strength of the status motive and
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productivity diﬀerences. Assuming a small preference for status and small productiv-
ity diﬀerences, such that β < 1 and t
2
1
t22
< 2(1+β)
1+2β
it can be shown that the inequalities
Ehet(w2) < t22 < t
2
1 < E
het(w1) still hold8 and the (expected) wage distribution becomes
E(whet2 ) = t
2
1
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+ t22
(1 + β)2
(1 + 2β)2
, with a weight of 1− ξ, (31)
E(whom1 ) = t
2
1, with a weight of 2ξ − 1,
E(whet1 ) = t
2
1
1 + 2β + 3
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+ t22
β(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)2
, with a weight of 1− ξ.
It can be further be shown that, in this range an increase in β raises E(whet1 ) and
reduces E(whet2 ).
We shall use the absolute Gini that averages the absolute wage diﬀerences in the
population (see Cowell, 2000) as a descriptive measure of inequality. For both (31) and
(32), this measure reduces to
I = ξ(1− ξ)[E(whet1 )− E(whet2 )].
Proposition 7 Assume that either ξ < .5, or that ξ > .5, the preference for status is
weak, and the productivity diﬀerences are small. Then
(i) An increase in status concerns β raises inequality.
(ii) An increase in the proportion of agents who care about status ξ raises inequality
if ξ < .5 and reduces inequality if ξ > .5.
The conditions that the preference for status is weak, and the productivity diﬀerences
are small are required only in the case in which type 1 workers are in the majority, ξ > .5.
In this case, type 2 workers can charge an increasingly higher payment for the association,
thereby reducing inequality.
Because average wages equal average output in the economy we can conclude that
Corollary 3 If the status minded workers are in a minority, ξ < .5, then an increase in
status concerns raises both the mean wage and wage inequality in the economy.
8For high values of β, the ranking of the t21 and E(w2) is reversed and a proportion 2ξ − 1 earn the
lowest wage ,t21, a proportion 1− ξ earn the middle wage E(w2) in (21) and a proportion 1 − ξ earn the
highest income, E(w1) in (22).
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This result in Corollary 3, that applies for comparisons across economies with diﬀerent
cultures, replicates the result in Corollary 2, that applies to comparisons across firms in
a given economy. The relation between mean performance and variability is positive in
both cases, because in our model inequality has incentive eﬀects on eﬀort that cause an
increase in output.
5.3 Comparison with Frank’s results
The results in this section are quite diﬀerent from those in Frank (1984a, 1984b), where
status concerns have no eﬀect on output and decrease rather than increase internal wage
diﬀerences and wage inequality. The sharp diﬀerence in results can be traced to the
assumptions about eﬀort.
For comparison with Frank’s results, assume that each worker supplies one unit of
eﬀort inelastically, but workers diﬀer in productivity and output is random, as before.
In this case, each worker in an homogenous firm receives an expected wage of ti and
his expected utility is ti − 1/2. When type 2 workers are in the majority, they receive
the same expected wage in homogenous and heterogenous firms, t2. The zero profits
condition for heterogenous firms, implies that type 1 workers receive E(w1) = t1. Thus,
in this case, the majority type 2 workers get the same wages regardless of where they
work and within firm diﬀerences equal the productivity diﬀerences. When ξ > .5, the
expected wages of the majority type 1 workers in heterogenous firm must be set in such
a way that they are indiﬀerent between working for homogenous or heterogenous firms,
that is, E(w1)+β[E(w1)−E(w2)]−1/2 = t1−1/2. Combining this indiﬀerence condition
with the zero profit condition yields
E(w1) =
t1 + β(t1 + t2)
1 + 2β
< t1, (32)
E(w2) =
t2 + β(t1 + t2)
1 + 2β
> t2.
Therefore for any positive β, t1 > E(w1) > E(w2) > t2 and the within firm diﬀerence
in expected wages is smaller than the diﬀerences in productivities. Moreover, as β rises,
both wages approach the mean productivity and wage diﬀerences tend to zero. Thus, as
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Frank (1984a,b) pointed out, in this case, status concerns reduce the inequality in income,
as measured by the absolute Gini. The reason is that, with inelastic supply of eﬀort and
in the absence of incentive considerations, the wage structure reflects only the pricing of
status. If there is a relative scarcity of the workers who do not care about status, the
majority workers who do care will have to pay for the association. However, when the
majority of the workers do not care about status, then, in equilibrium, there is no need
for the status minded workers to pay for the association, and the wage diﬀerences within
and across firms are the same. Precisely the same results are obtained if eﬀort is variable
but independent of status. For instance, if status is awarded based on comparisons of the
productivity levels t1 and t2.
In ourmodel, status concerns interact with the willingness of workers to exert eﬀort. As
we have shown, despite the wage compression associated with status seeking, the induced
changes in eﬀort and output are suﬃciently large to support an increase in internal wage
diﬀerences and wage inequality.9 The diﬀerent implications for the income distribution
are illustrated in figures 2a and 2b.
Given the conflicting results on wage inequality, one may ask what results hold for any
cost of eﬀort v(ei) that is rising and convex. Propositions 1 and 2 on eﬀort and Proposition
3 on mixing continue to hold for any such cost function. However, our results on output
and wages is sensitive to the specification of the disutility from eﬀort. We assume, in this
paper, that the marginal disutility from eﬀort is linear. This specification is commonly
used in the analysis of linear incentive contracts, because of its tractability. We note that
Frank’s results continue to hold even if eﬀort is variable but the modified behavior is such
that type 1 workers do not increase their eﬀort much, while type 2 workers reduce their
eﬀort substantially. In such a case, the organization of work in heterogenous firms reduces
output and it is possible to construct examples in which status concerns actually reduces
wage diﬀerences.10
9Frank (1985, p. 88-89) discusses briefly the case in which workers supply eﬀort. He argues that such
a setup may provide an alternative explanation for why wages are compressed, because firms may put a
cap on earnings to prevent an ineﬃcient ’rat-race’ competition for status. This statement is consistent
with our result that weaker incentives are provided in homogenous firms. The main departure, however,
arises in the case of heterogenous firms, where preferences for status diﬀer. In this case, diﬀerences in
eﬀort and wages are eﬃcient, from a collective point of view.
10As an extreme example, assume that eﬀort is either 0 or 1 and that the cost of 1 unit of eﬀort is c,
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6 Unobservable status concerns
Suppose that the status concerns of workers, δi, are not observed by the firms, while
the workers’ productivity levels, ti, are observable. Assume further that the workers’
productivity is determined by investment in schooling prior to entry into the labor force.
For simplicity, we assume two schooling levels (0 and 1) and let the cost of acquiring 1
unit of schooling be x. The productivity level of an agent without schooling is normalized
to 1, and the productivity level of an agent with schooling is labeled t1, where t1 > 1.
Consider now the following two stage model: At the first stage, each agent decides
whether or not to invest in education. The second stage is a market game in which
firms oﬀer employment contracts and workers choose the firm they work for and the wage
contract. Firms oﬀer contracts based on the education level that they observe. The wage
contracts do not depend on the agents’ type, which is not observable by firms. There is
a free entry to the market so firms will enter as long as they can oﬀer contract that yield
non-negative profits.
The focus of our analysis is the existence of a separating equilibrium, in which status
minded workers acquire schooling, while workers who do not care about status do not
acquire schooling. Such a separating equilibrium can justify our previous assumption
that t1 > t2. We continue and refer to socially minded individuals as type 1 agents and
to those who do not care about status as type 2 agents.
Proposition 8 For any given β > 0 and t1 > 1, there exist an interval for the cost of
schooling, x, such that a separating equilibrium exists, where type 1 individuals acquire
education, while type 2 individuals do not invest in schooling.
Proof. See Appendix.
The existence of separating equilibria is supported by the fact that a worker who does
not care about status and acquires schooling will exert less eﬀort than a status minded
where c < t2 < t1. Assume that ξ > .5. A type 1 worker in homogenous firms will supply 1 unit of eﬀort
and get a wage of t1. When mixed with a type 2 worker, he will exert the same eﬀort and get the same
utility. Because he also gets status, his wage must decline. If t2 − c is small such that ct2 >
1+β
1+2β
, the
type 2 worker will be induces, in equilibrium, to spend no eﬀort. In this case, output is t1 and the wage
diﬀerence is w1 − w2 = t1−2c1+2β , which (given that t2 − c is small) is less than t1 − t2.
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worker facing the same incentives. Therefore, his marginal benefit from schooling is lower
and he will refrain from investment at same costs at which the social minded workers find
it profitable to invest. The higher is the marginal utility from status, β, the larger are the
diﬀerences in eﬀort and earnings between the two types and, therefore, it will be easier
for the socially minded agents to separate themselves. If socially minded workers are in
the minority, they pay less to those who do not care about status for the association.
Thus, a pretender (i.e., a type 2 worker who acquires schooling) will obtain a higher fixed
payment. In this case, a higher cost of schooling is required to separate the two types.
Because schooling raises productivity, it is clear that if the costs of schooling are
suﬃciently low, everyone will acquire schooling, while if the costs are high, no one will
acquire schooling. In either of these cases, schooling has no signaling value. It is still
possible for a separating equilibrium to exist, because firms can oﬀer diﬀerent contracts
and workers will self select based on their preferences as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
However, we find signaling through schooling the more interesting case, because it appears
that schools do in fact identify not only ability, as suggested by Spence (1974) and others,
but also the response to incentives, a factor which we may refer to as motivation.
It has been recognized by many observers that schooling is a source of attaining higher
social status (see Weiss and Fershtman, 1998). It is not surprising, therefore, that agents
who care about status invest more in schooling. The more subtle issue concerns the impact
of status on the monetary returns for schooling. If status is highly valued, then educated
workers need not be compensated for the costs of investment, and may in fact have lower
earnings, which eventually can detract from their social status. The fact that the market
pays a substantial return for schooling, exceeding the return of other investments, suggests
that educated workers diﬀer in their attributes from the non educated workers. Most of the
empirical research on this problem concentrated on the role of ability, as an unmeasured
attribute that explains the returns for schooling. Recent findings indicate that ability has
only a small impact on the monetary returns from schooling (see Ashenfelter et al., 1999).
Our analysis suggests a potential role for unobserved eﬀort, or motivation, whereby the
highly educated are compensated, in part, for additional eﬀort. This view is consistent
with the positive correlation between education and measured eﬀort in the form of longer
hours (see Coleman and Pencavel, 1993).
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7 Risk aversion
We now turn to the case in which workers are risk averse. The purpose of introducing risk
aversion is to tie our analysis with the wide literature that examines second best contracts
within firms (see Prendergast, 1999, and Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). We show that
status concerns aﬀect both the strength of the monetary incentives that firms provide and
the way in which firms evaluate relative performance.
We continue to focus on local status and assume, for simplicity, that f (.) is exponential,
so that fi(xi) = −e−αxi, i = 1, 2, where α is the risk aversion parameter and xi =
wi + δ
l
iβ
l(wi − wj)− 12e2i . Assuming further that εi is normally distributed one obtains a
certainty equivalent −exp[E(xi)− ασ
2
xi
2
]. Therefore, the optimal contract must maximize
expected profits subject to the constraints that E(xi) − ασ
2
xi
2
≥ ri. Thus, the model
conserves the property of transferable utility and equations (5) - (7) continue to hold.
The optimal contract must maximize the joint objective
W = t1e1 + e2t2 − λ1[v(e1) + ασ
2
x1
2
]− λ2[v(e2) + ασ
2
x2
2
], (33)
where the σ2xi terms depend on the choice of contract. We assume a linear contract of the
form,
wi = si + aiyi + biyj (34)
Given this wage scheme, worker i chooses the eﬀort level,
ei = aiti + δiβ(aiti − bjti) (35)
and σ2xi is given by,
σ2xi = σ
2[(ai(1 + δiβ)− δiβbj)2 + (bi(1 + δiβ)− ajδiβ)2]. (36)
The first term represents the variability of the utility of worker i resulting from the
variability of his own output, and the second term represents the variability of the utility
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of worker i resulting from the variability of the output of the other worker. If binding
contracts on eﬀort and wages could be enforced, the firm would provide perfect insurance
and workers would agree to provide the first best level of eﬀort, as under risk neutrality.
However, because eﬀort is not contractible, the optimal contract maximizes (33) with
respect to the contractual parameters, given (35). Thus, we obtain a second best contract
that trades oﬀ the incentive for eﬀort against the need for insurance.
The optimization problem of the firm can be solved in two steps. In the first step,
the eﬀort levels are kept constant and choose the policy parameters (a1, a2, b1, b2) are
chosen to minimize risk associated with the fixed levels of eﬀort, and in the second step
we choose the optimal eﬀort level given that risk is minimized. Inspection of the variance
terms in (36) shows that the first term is proportional to ei, so the first step requires
the minimization of the term (bi(1 + δiβ) − ajδiβ)2, which represents the variability of
the utility of worker i resulting from the variability of the output of the other worker.
This variability is induced by the status preferences δiβ and the policy parameters bi and
aj. For any given levels of eﬀort, it is always possible to choose policy parameters that
provides perfect insurance against shocks in yj, implying that the second term is set to
zero. Moving to the second step, we now obtain that
ei =
ti
λi(1 +
ασ2
t2i
)
. (37)
Compared with the first best solution under certainty, where ei = tiλi , eﬀort is reduced.
This reflects the compromise between incentives and insurance. The contractual param-
eters supporting the solution are,
ai =
1
λi(1 +
ασ2
t2i
)
1 + δjβ
1 + δiβ + δjβ
, (38)
and
bi =
1
λj(1 +
ασ2
t2j
)
1 + δiβ
1 + δjβ + δiβ
δiβ
1 + δiβ
. (39)
In contrast to the case with risk neutrality, where one could support the first best eﬀort
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levels without conditioning on the output of the other worker, the second best solution
requires that the wage of each worker depends positively on the output of both workers.
The reason is that positive incentives for eﬀort for worker j imply that his wages depend
on εj. This creates status shocks to worker i. To alleviate this variability in status, the
wage of worker i depends positively on the output of worker j. This result is in contrast to
comparative payments based on a positive correlation in the random shocks. There, the
typical result is that i0s wages depend negatively on the output of his coworker, because
high output of the co-worker indicates that luck (rather than eﬀort) influences i’s output
(see Prendergast,1999, and Gibbons and Waldman, 1999).
Note that when σ = 0 (or α = 0) we get the same eﬀort level as first best. However,
the contractual parameters do not converge to the parameters in equations (9) and (10).
This reflects the non-uniqueness of the contractual parameters under risk neutrality. In
fact, the limiting values of the contractual parameters,
ai =
1 + δjβ
1 + 2δjβ
, bi =
δiβ
1 + 2δiβ
(40)
also support the first best, providing the same levels of eﬀort and utility for all agents.
Examining the expressions in (38) and (39), it is readily seen that the presence of
risk aversion magnifies the impact of status concerns. That is, in heterogenous firms, the
worker who does not (does) care about status is induced to provide even less (more) eﬀort
than in the case of risk neutrality. This holds because the status externalities aﬀect both
the mean and the variance of utility. Except for these diﬀerences, the main results that
we have proved under risk neutrality continue to hold.
8 Other status concerns
So far, we have considered the eﬀect of local status, when the reference group is one’s co-
workers. We also assumed that local status depends only the ranking of wages, irrespective
of diﬀerences in eﬀort. We now describe briefly the eﬀects of some alternative social norms.
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8.1 Global status
Assume that meetings occur in two spheres, social sphere where one meets a random
person in the society, and professional sphere where one meets those with whom he works.
Both groups can be used as reference groups, whereby local status is determined by wage
comparisons with one’s co-workers and global status is determined by wage comparisons
with the average wage in society. We denote the weights that workers give to these two
concerns by δiβ
l and δiβ
g, respectively, where δi ∈ {0, 1}.
If workers care only about global status, it does not matter how work is organized and
which type of firms are formed. Workers who do not care about status will exert the eﬀort
e2 = t2, while workers who care about global status will choose the eﬀort e1 = t1(1+ β
g),
irrespectively of the identity of the co-worker. This solution is not eﬃcient, because both
types of workers ignore the impact on other type 1 workers and work too much . In other
words, global status concerns lead to excessive competition, raising eﬀort and output but
reducing welfare.
If workers care about both local and global status, then the eﬀort levels in homogenous
firms employing two workers with the same preferences are independent of the local status
parameter βl and are given by ei = ti(1 + δβ
g). Local status concerns that are purely
relative wash out, because they do not aﬀect the total ”pie” to be distributed among the
three agents. However, global status concerns do influence the outcome. In fact, because
the firm does not internalize the social interactions, this outcome is the same as would
obtain if workers would care only about global status, or are self employed.
To implement this first best outcome, the firm may oﬀer a contract that gives the
incentive ai = 1, if the two workers do not care about status, and ai =
1+βg
1+βg+βl
if the
two workers care about status. The stronger the global concerns, the stronger will be the
monetary incentive. In this sense, the firm respects the desire of workers to attain global
status. However, the higher is the local status concern β, the weaker is the monetary
incentive. Incentives are slackened because an increased eﬀort of one agent has a negative
impact on the utility of the other worker in the firm. The optimal scheme forces each
worker to internalize this eﬀect. In contrast, the firm does not internalize the eﬀect on
workers employed by other firms. Thus, the social ineﬃciency, that we noted above,
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persists and workers in homogenous firms still work too much, from a social point of view.
If workers in the same firm diﬀer in preferences, then the first best eﬀort levels of the
worker who cares about status and, of the worker who does not care, respectively, are
e1 = (1 + β
g + βl)t1, e2 =
(1 + βg + β l)t2
(1 + βg + 2β l)
. (41)
The firm can achieve the first best by setting
a1 = 1; a2 =
(1 + βg + β l)
(1 + βg + 2βl)
. (42)
We conclude that:
Proposition 9 A firm employing two workers with diﬀerent preferences for status gives
the worker with the higher demand for local status a stronger incentive to exert eﬀort.
The worker who cares about local status exerts more eﬀort than he would in a firm with
identical workers, while the worker who does not care about local status will exert less eﬀort
than he would in a firm with identical workers. Stronger local status concerns weakens
the wage incentives given by the heterogenous firm, but stronger global status concerns
sharpens the wage incentives.
Because we assume that workers who care about status are more productive, it still
holds that output is enhanced if heterogenous firms are formed. However, it is not true any
more that combining workers into mixed firm enhances eﬃciency, because workers who
work alone or in homogenous firms work too much from a social point of view. Compared
with the ineﬃcient equilibrium with self employed or homogenous firms, the heterogenous
firm induces type 1 workers to work more, which impairs eﬃciency and induces type 2
worker to work less, which enhances eﬃciency. The overall impact on eﬃciency is not
clear.
8.2 Comparisons of eﬀort
One may assume that, within firms, workers observe the eﬀort of their co-workers, in
addition to their output (see Lazear, 1989, and Kandel and Lazear, 1992). In such a case,
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local status and the costs of eﬀort may depend also on comparisons of eﬀort. For instance,
the status of a high wage person may be modified downward if he exerts more eﬀort to
achieve this outcome. In addition, socially minded workers may feel more inclined to exert
eﬀort if others do. We can capture these two considerations by adding a term δiα(ei−ej)2
to the utility function, where α < 0.
If a mixed firm is formed then the first best levels of eﬀort are now chosen to maximize
W = t1e1 + e2t2 + λ1[δ1α(e1 − e2)2 − v(e1)] + λ2[δ2α(e2 − e1)2 − v(e2)], (43)
where λi are given by (6) Note that, for α < 0, the common ”pie”, W , is concave and
the two eﬀort levels are complements (i.e., ∂W
2
∂e1∂e2
> 0).
The eﬀort levels in homogenous firms are the same as before, by ei = ti, independently
of α and β. However, the eﬀort levels in heterogenous firms are now
e1 = (1 + β)
t1(1 + 2β − 2α)− 2t2α
(1 + 2β)(1− 2α) − 2α , (44)
e2 = (1 + β)
t2(1− 2α)− 2t1α
(1 + 2β)(1− 2α)− 2α < e1.
It is still true that the workers who care about status are induces to exert more eﬀort,
however the diﬀerence in eﬀort between the two types declines monotonically when the
parameter α declines and the two eﬀort levels become more complementary. In the limit,
as α approaches -∞ both workers would exert the same eﬀort t1+t2
2
. To see that this cannot
be an equilibrium, recall that, with transferable utility, a heterogenous firm survives
competition only if the maximized joint ”pie” is larger than the sum of the utilities that
the two workers can obtain by joining homogenous firms, or becoming self employed. It
is thus necessary that W > t21 + t
2
2. However, because α < 0, W must be smaller than
the total output, t1e1+ e2t2, which approaches a limit
(t1+t2)
2
2
that is smaller than t21 + t
2
1.
Thus, with modest demand for wage superiority but large aversion to discrepancies in
eﬀort, heterogenous firms will not be formed.
This simple observation resembles a known result from tournament theory that, if
workers’ productivities diﬀer then homogenous, rather that heterogenous firms, are formed.
It is more eﬃcient to have a tournament between similar workers, because the maximal
31
incentive for eﬀort is given when the density is at its peak and the probability of receiving
a prize is most sensitive to eﬀort (Lazear and Rosen, 1981, MacLaughlin, 1988).11 The
basic diﬀerence between our setting and tournaments is that in our setting there is a direct
link between relative eﬀort (wages) and utility, while in tournaments the contract creates
a link between relative eﬀort and utility, where, in fact, there are no interactions in costs
or outputs.12 Nevertheless, it remains true that if we use ”tournament like” preferences
where, the maximal incentives for eﬀort is provided when eﬀort levels are similar, then
mixing is not optimal.13
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper has several implications for incentive contracts. The first implication is that
incentives depend on the organization of firms. Homogenous firms with only status minded
workers are characterized by low-powered incentives because workers in such firms have a
strong intrinsic desire to climb the internal status hierarchy, and would over-exert eﬀort
if they received high-powered incentives. In heterogenous firms, on the other hand, the
worker who cares about status will face high-powered incentives, while the worker who
does not care about status will face low-powered incentives, due to the one-way negative
income externality in such firms. Because we argue that status minded workers are more
likely to invest in schooling, one may test directly whether workers with schooling get
stronger incentives to exert eﬀort. Although it is well known that work hours tend to
increase with education, we are not aware of studies of the relation between schooling and
incentives within firms.
The second implication is that the organization of firms will not be arbitrary, but is
11Assuming that types are known. When types are not known there can be adverse selection, in that
low productivity types are attracted to the major leagues, since average prizes are higher.
12Another diﬀerence is that we assume that enough instruments exist to achieve a first best when
agents diﬀer. With additional instruments like handicaps, the equilibrium mixing will be indeterminate
under tournament rewards, because it is assumed that output of agents are independent and there are
no status externalities, as in our model. Handicaps in asymmetric tournaments are considered by Lazear
and Rosen (1981), MacLaughlin (1988), and Meyer (1992).
13Lazear (1989), considers a similar kind of interaction in eﬀort where workers can spend eﬀort to
make the other look worse, in the context of tournaments. He shows that firms respond by raising wage
equality and by avoiding the mixing of workers with diﬀerent preferences for sabotage.
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determined by the competitive forces. Heterogenous firms form in equilibrium, because
such firms can create a status surplus compared to homogenous firms. Thus, their for-
mation and subsequent choice of incentives depends on supply and demand conditions,
as indicated by the relative number and productivity of workers who care about status.
Since agents that care about status have a stronger incentive to invest in human capital,
such workers will endogenously be more productive than workers that care less about
status.
The third implication concerns the relationship between wage diﬀerences and morale.
If relative wages aﬀect morale, what should the relative wage between high-productivity
workers and low productivity workers be? The trade-oﬀ involves taking into consideration
that paying more the high-productivity workers increases their morale but also decreases
low-productivity workers morale. However, we argue that the firm can coordinate the
workers eﬀort levels in such away that the low productivity worker is compensated for
lower wages through reduced eﬀort. Moreover, in the equilibrium of our model, the sorting
is such that low-productivity workers do not care about status and hence do not get a
negative morale shock if wages of high-productivity workers are increased.
In addition, our analysis has some implications for wage diﬀerences across firms and
between workers with diﬀerent schooling. We argue that, because of the interaction be-
tween status and eﬀort, firms with higher wage inequality are able to pay higher mean
wages. The same idea can be applied to other situations where local status matters. For
instance, integration of schools that raises the variance in learning ability may raise aver-
age achievement, because the top students will be more motivated to excel. We also show
that observationally identical workers, with the same schooling, may have diﬀerent wages,
depending on the characteristics of their co-workers, because they are placed diﬀerently
in the internal status hierarchy and moreover get diﬀerent incentives to exert eﬀort. For
example, the single star of an academic department may have stronger incentives to pub-
lish and may receive a higher wage than an equally able researcher in a top academic
department.
Most of our results depend on the assumption that individuals have diﬀerent prefer-
ences for status, generating trade opportunities between status and wages or status and
eﬀort. The result that heterogeneity in preferences raises aggregate output suggests the
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possibility that such preferences are evolutionarily stable. But this issue must be left for
future research.
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10 Appendix: proof of Proposition 8
We shall now present the bounds on the costs of schooling such that a separating equilib-
rium exists. We start out with the case ξ < 0.5 and then consider the case ξ > 0.5.
Case 1(ξ < 0.5): If a type 1 agent joins an homogenous firm employing two workers
with no schooling (and where the other worker is of type 2) his pay schedule will be
whom2 = y. In such a case, he exerts the eﬀort 1 + β. His total wage will be 1 + β. His
co-worker, who is of type 2, will have the same incentives but his choice of eﬀort is 1
and his expected wage is 1. The local status of the type 1 worker will be β2, implying
expected utility of 1
2
(1 + β)2 − β. However, the same worker may join an heterogenous
firm as an uneducated worker accepting the wage schedule
whet2 = −
1
2
[
(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)
]2 +
1
2
+
1 + β
1 + 2β
y. (A1)
Given such a contract, the agent exerts the eﬀort (1+β)
2
1+ 2β
. This eﬀort level yields the total
wage
−1
2
[
(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)
]2 +
1
2
+
1 + β
1 + 2β
(1 + β)2
1 + 2β
=
1 + 2β + β2/2
(1 + 2β)
. (A2)
In such a firm, his co-worker will be an educated type 1 worker with productivity t1, and
who chooses the eﬀort level (1 + β) t1 and gets the total wage
Emi(w1) = (1 + β)t
2
1 −
β2
2(1 + 2β)2
. (A3)
The local status in such a case will be
β{1 + 2β + β
2/2
(1 + 2β)
− (1 + β)t21 +
β2
2(1 + 2β)2
} = β 1 + 4β + 5β
2 + β3
(1 + 2β)2
− β(1 + β)t21. (A4)
The agent’s expected utility in this case is
1 + 2β + β2/2
(1 + 2β)
+ β
1 + 4β + 5β2 + β3
(1 + 2β)2
− β(1 + β)t21 −
1
2
[
(1 + β)2
(1 + 2β)
]2
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Comparing the two options yields that as long as t1 > 1,
1
2
(1 + β)2 − β > 1 + 6β + 11β
2 + 8β3 + β4
2(1 + 2β)2
− β(1 + β)t21, (A6)
which implies that if a player type 1 chooses not to get education, he will be better oﬀ
joining a homogenous firm. Intuitively, if he joins an heterogenous firm, the agent gets
lower incentives for eﬀort and a negative local status. Although uneducated workers are
paid a positive fixed amount to join heterogenous firms, this amount is not suﬃcient to
reverse the other eﬀects, as seen in (A6). Thus, the necessary condition for separating
equilibrium is that a type 1 agent is better oﬀ from educating and joining an heterogenous
firm, rather than not educating and joining an homogenous firm. Specifically,
1
2
(1 + β)2t21 +
2β + 3β2
2(1 + 2β)
− x > 1
2
(1 + β)2 − β. (A7)
Rearranging this condition yield the following necessary condition:
(1 + β)2t21 − 2x >
1− 2β2 + 2β3
(1 + 2β)
. (A8)
Now suppose that an agent of type 2 deviates and acquires schooling, then he will be
considered a member of the type 1 minority and work in an heterogenous firm as an
educated worker getting the wage schedule w = y − β2
2(1+2β)2
. In such a case, this agent
will choose an eﬀort level of t1, implying expected utility of 12t
2
1 − β
2
2(1+2β)2
− x. Thus,
a necessary condition for a separating equilibrium is that agent type 2 is better oﬀ not
getting education. That is,
1
2
>
1
2
t21 −
β2
2(1 + 2β)2
− x. (A9)
Rearranging yields the following condition
2x > (t21 − 1)−
β2
(1 + 2β)2
. (A10)
Putting the two conditions (A8) and (A10) together yields that a separating equilibrium
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exists only when
(1 + β)2t21 −
1− 2β2 + 2β3
(1 + 2β)
> 2x > t21 −
1 + 4β + 5β2
(1 + 2β)2
. (A11)
It is easy to verify that the l.h.s. of (A11) is greater than the r.h.s. as long as t1 > 1. Thus,
the above equation define a range for x for which there exists a separating equilibrium.
Case 2 (ξ > 0.5): In this case type 2 agents are the minority. Consider now the
separating equilibrium in which there are heterogenous firms and homogenous firms that
employ two workers of type 1. The homogenous firms oﬀer the employment contract
whom1 given by (27) for educated workers and the heterogenous firms oﬀer the employment
contract whet1 given by equation (28) and (30) for educated workers and the contract w
het
2
given by (31) and (33) for uneducated workers. In such a case, type 2 workers do not get
education and accept the contract from an heterogenous firm and type 1 workers acquire
education and accept one of the two employment contracts oﬀered to them. Their utilities
will be,
E(u1) =
1
2
t21 − x, E(u2) = t21
β + 1
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+
(1 + β)2
2(1 + 2β)2
. (A12)
Suppose that an agent of type 1 deviates and skips education. In that case, he can get
a position as a type 2 worker in a heterogenous firm, where his co-worker will be an
educated type 1 worker. The compensation scheme that he will get in such a case is
whet2 = t
2
1
2β + β2
2(1 + 2β)
+
1 + β
1 + 2β
y. (A13)
Given such a contract, the agent exerts the eﬀort (1+β)
2
1+ 2β
. This eﬀort level yields the total
wage t21
2β+β2
2(1+2β)
+ (1+β)
3
(1+ 2β)2
. His type 1 co-worker, who got education and has the productivity
t1, chooses the eﬀort level of (1 + β) t1 and gets a total wage of
Emj(w1) = t
2
1
1 + 2β + 3
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
+
β(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)2
.
39
The local status in such a case will be
β{t21
2β + β2
2(1 + 2β)
+
(1 + β)3
(1 + 2β)2
− t21
1 + 2β + 3
2
β2
(1 + 2β)
− β(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)2
} (A14)
= β
(1 + β)(1 + β + β2)
(1 + 2β)2
− β 1 + β + β
2
(1 + 2β)
t21.
The agent’s expected utility will be in this case
t21
2β + β2
2(1 + 2β)
+
(1 + β)3
(1 + 2β)2
+ β
(1 + β)(1 + β + β2)
(1 + 2β)2
− β 1 + β + β
2
(1 + 2β)
t21 −
1
2
[
(1 + β)2
(1 + 2β)
]2
=
(1 + β)(1 + 3β + β2 + β3)
2(1 + 2β)2
− β
2
2
t21. (A15)
Thus, a necessary condition for a separating equilibrium is that player of type 1 is better
oﬀ not deviating. i.e.,
(1 + β)(1 + 3β + β2 + β3)
2(1 + 2β)2
− β
2
2
t21 <
1
2
t21 − x, (A16)
which after simplification gives the condition
2x < (1 + β2)t21 −
(1 + β)(1 + 3β + β2 + β3)
(1 + 2β)2
. (A17)
Now suppose that an agent of type 2 deviates and chooses to acquire schooling. In such
a case, he will be considered as a type 1 worker and will be able to choose to work in an
homogenous firm or in heterogenous firm. Working in an homogenous firm, he will get
the payment schedule of whom = β
(1+β)
t21 +
y
(1+β)
. Given these compensation, his choice
of eﬀort is e = 1
(1+β)
t1, which yields the utility of
β
(1+β)
t21 +
t21
2(1+β)2
− x. On the other
hand, working in an heterogenous firm as an educated worker, the agent will get the wage
schedule w = y − t21 2β+β
2
2(1+2β)
+ β(1+β)
(1+2β)2
. In such a case, the agent will choose an eﬀort level
of t1, implying expected utility of 12t
2
1− t21 2β+β
2
2(1+2β)
+ β(1+β)
(1+2β)2
−x. Comparing the expressions
in yields that if player 2 is deviating he is better oﬀ working for an heterogenous firm,
provided that β is not too large.
Thus, a necessary condition for a separating equilibrium is that agent type 2 is better
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oﬀ not getting education. That is,
t21
2β + β2
2(1 + 2β)
+
(1 + β)2
2(1 + 2β)2
>
1
2
t21 − t21
2β + β2
2(1 + 2β)
+
β(1 + β)
(1 + 2β)2
− x, (A18)
which after rearranging yields the condition
2x > t21
1− 2β − 2β2
(1 + 2β)
− 1− β
2
(1 + 2β)2
. (A19)
Putting the two conditions (A17) and (A19) together yields that a separating equilibrium
exists only when
(1 + β2)t21 −
(1 + β)(1 + 3β + β2 + β3)
(1 + 2β)2
> 2x > t21
1− 2β − 2β2
(1 + 2β)
− 1− β
2
(1 + 2β)2
. (A20)
It is easy to verify that the l.h.s. of (A20) is greater than the r.h.s. as long as t1 > 1.
Thus the above equation defines a range for x for which there is a separating equilibrium.
It is also readily seen that the lower bound of the range is higher when ξ < .5. The upper
bound will be higher when ξ < .5 only if β is not too high, that is if 8 + 16β − 3β2 > 0.
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